By Bill Brewer
Invoice Brewer offers an unique view of the position of wakeful adventure within the acquisition of empirical wisdom. He argues that perceptual studies needs to offer purposes for empirical ideals if there are to be any determinate ideals in any respect approximately specific items on the earth. This clean method of epistemology turns clear of the quest for useful and enough stipulations for wisdom and works as a substitute from a thought of figuring out in a selected area.
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Additional info for Perception and Reason
The error, and its correction, are, in this way, internal to his thinking, intrinsic features of the relevant Ideas themselves. Belief and Experience Z 7 Things are very different with the second possibility, of multiple satisfaction. Again, this is always a live possibility in a certain sense. For however detailed and extensive the description may be, there is always the possibility, in principle at least, of a reduplication elsewhere in the universe of the whole scene as described. The crucial difference with the first case of emptiness is that there is absolutely nothing which can be done within the subject's thinking, as it were, even to attempt to avoid the possibility of massive reduplication: nothing essential to any purely descriptive Idea rules out this possibility.
Provided only that massive reduplication is not actualized (and assuming that there is no perceptual error, so at least one object satisfies the relevant description), then a purely descriptive Idea succeeds in identifying a unique spatial particular; and a belief comprising such an Idea succeeds in being a belief about that particular mind-independent thing. This must be so, on pain of obliterating altogether the possibility of any descriptive identification of spatial particulars, even in the surely uncontroversial impure cases, as I shall call them, in which certain of the particulars employed in the relevant descriptive map are uniquely pinned down by perceptual demonstrative identification, as in an Idea like 'the red ball under that table'.
Granting this possibility, though, all we insist on for 15 Notice that I am assuming here, in my claim that the possibility of emptiness is not always an epistemic possibility, the datum with which I began Ch. , and which I aim to explicate in detail throughout this book, that people like us do have perceptual knowledge about the mind-independent world around them. This is how it is that a person is often in a position knowledgeably to rule out the possibility that a suitable description is empty: he can just see, say, that there is a red ball under the glass table between the chair and the sofa in front of the round white window in front of him.