By Bob Hale
Necessary Beings is anxious with primary components of metaphysics: modality--the concept of necessity, risk, and different comparable notions; and ontology--the normal research of what types of entities there are. Bob Hale's overarching function is to strengthen and shield really basic theses approximately what's required for the life of entities of assorted varieties: that questions about what sorts of issues there are can't be thoroughly understood or correctly replied with no recourse to issues approximately threat and necessity, and that, conversely, questions on the character and foundation of necessity and threat can't be satisfactorily tackled with no drawing on what may be referred to as the method of ontology. Taken jointly, those theses declare that ontology and modality are collectively established upon each other, neither extra basic than the opposite.
Hale defends a commonly Fregean method of metaphysics, based on which ontological differences between other forms of items (objects, homes, and relatives) are to be drawn at the foundation of previous differences among various logical forms of expression. The declare that proof approximately what varieties of issues exist depend on evidence approximately what's attainable makes little experience until one accepts that not less than a few modal proof are basic, and never reducible to proof of a few different, non-modal, type. He argues that evidence approximately what's totally worthwhile or attainable have this personality, and they have their resource or foundation, no longer in meanings or ideas nor in proof approximately replacement 'worlds', yet within the natures or essences of items.
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Extra resources for Necessary Beings: An Essay on Ontology, Modality, and the Relations Between Them
It is consistent with this that R should be some other binary relational expression standing for the same relation as ‘refers to’. It is to rule this out that we need the Reference Principle: if R stood for the same relation as ‘refers to’ we should be able to substitute R for ‘refers to’ salva congruitate—but plainly we cannot do so, since any well-formed sentence ‘x refers to y’ will become ill-formed if R is put for ‘refers to’, since R requires a predicate in its second argument place, but y must be a singular term.
What I am calling the Reference Principle is clearly a consequence of Wright’s principle. It is certainly arguable that Frege is committed to the stronger reference principle Wright states, and some writers do not hesitate to attribute that principle to him (cf. 163); but it is the weaker principle that most matters for our purposes. 54. 26 ontological preliminaries Frege’s considered response, which has been elaborated by Michael Dummett, and in a somewhat different way, by Peter Geach & Harold Noonan, was the last—denying (d).
Further, it is not simply the copula that Dummett’s Frege must dismiss as a merely grammatical device. He needs to maintain that ‘what “ξ loves ς” stands for’ is completely interchangeable with ‘ξ loves ς‘, and that ‘what “ξ is between ς and υ” stands for’ interchangeable with ‘ξ is between ς and υ‘. But the results of interchanging these expressions in ‘George loves Mary’ and ‘Birmingham is between London and Liverpool’—viz ‘George what “ξ loves ς” stands for Mary’ and ‘Birmingham “what ξ is between ς and υ” stands for London and Liverpool’—are simply grotesque.