Epistemic Entitlement: The Right to Believe by H. Matthiessen

By H. Matthiessen

In Epistemic Entitlement. the perfect to Believe Hannes Ole Matthiessen develops a social externalist account of epistemic entitlement and perceptual wisdom. the fundamental suggestion is that optimistic epistemic prestige may be understood as a particular form of epistemic right, that is a correct to think. due to the fact that rights have outcomes for a way others are required to regard the bearer of the perfect, they must be publicly obtainable. the writer as a result means that epistemic entitlement can plausibly be conceptualized as a standing that's grounded in a publicly observable perceptual state of affairs, instead of in a perceptual adventure as present theories of epistemic entitlement nation.
 
It is then argued that one of these social externalist account of entitlement, during which the perceiver's epistemic viewpoint turns into proper in simple terms within the unprecedented case where an entitlement is challenged, can however do justice to our significant intuitions approximately first-personal epistemic phenomenology.

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595). According to Dretske’s conception of epistemic entitlement, you can have a right to believe when your method is completely unreliable, and you can lack a right to believe although your method is as reliable as one might wish. As our analysis reveals, Dretske’s epistemological framework contains two logically independent types of positive epistemic status, both of which are valuable. Someone who knows but is not entitled to her belief is in a worse position than someone who knows and is entitled.

504). Since externalist conditions for knowledge typically focus mainly on reliability, there is no place in these accounts for normativity. Whether or not an individual follows the rules of cognition is irrelevant to her epistemic status. Burge, in contrast, wants to stress the connection between the fulfilment of epistemic norms and epistemic rights. As we shall see, Burge does not require an entitled individual to be consciously guided by an epistemic norm. It is enough that the belief formation conforms to it.

So it seems that all the evidence I could gain to discard sceptical hypotheses is only as strong as my prior warrant for regarding these empirical methods as a valid source of warrant. Therefore, it is impossible to acquire any warrant for the falsehood of sceptical hypotheses. As Wright rightly observes, however, the sceptic’s success depends on equating being unable to acquire warrant with lacking warrant. Once we have reason to suppose that our belief in the falsehood of scepticism may be warranted, although we cannot acquire warrant by providing evidence, we have a strong response against the sceptic.

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